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Abstract 
 
Fiscal rules specify quantitative targets for key budgetary aggregates. In this paper, we 
review the experience with such rules in Japan and in the EU. Comparing the performance of 
fiscal policy in the 1980s and 1990s until 2003, we find that the fiscal rule of the 1980s 
exerted some but not much disciplinary influence on Japanese fiscal policy. The fiscal rule of 
the Maastricht Treaty had a significant impact on political budget cycles in the EU, but did 
little to constrain fiscal policy in the large member states. Since the start of the European 
Monetary Union, the disciplinary effect of the fiscal rule in the EU has vanished. Next, we 
discuss the importance of budgetary institutions for the effectiveness of fiscal rules. In 
Europe, a number of countries adopted strong fiscal rules, i.e., a fiscal rule combined with a 
design of the budget process enabling governments to commit to the rule. We find that 
strong fiscal rules have been effective. We conclude with some suggestions for the design of 
a strong fiscal rule in Japan. 
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 Non-technical Summary 
The past two decades have seen a growing interest in fiscal rules. Fiscal rules specify 
numerical targets for key budgetary aggregates such as annual government deficits, debts, 
or spending. Fiscal rules have a long history at the sub-national level (e.g., von Hagen and 
Eichengreen, 1996), and some countries including Japan and Germany have had less 
specific rules such as the “Golden Rule,” which limits government borrowing to investment 
spending, at the national level for a long time. What is new is the application of specific 
annual targets at the national level. It has been part of the reaction to the rapid rise in debt 
levels and the emergence of unsustainable deficits following the breakdown of the Bretton 
Woods System and the oil crises on the 1970s in many countries around the world. Thus, the 
goal of fiscal rules is to improve fiscal discipline and reduce government deficits and debts. 
The Fiscal Consolidation Agreement adopted in Japan in 1981 is an early example of 
a fiscal rule. In Europe, the Maastricht Treaty introduced fiscal rules for the member states of 
the European Union (EU) through the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), which was later 
strengthened and complemented by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).  
The attractiveness of fiscal rules as a way to contain the spending and deficit biases 
of democratic governments is due to the apparent simplicity of a rules-based framework. 
Once the rule is in place, it seems straightforward to measure the government’s performance 
against it. But in practice, it is by no means clear that fiscal rules are effective. A first reason 
is that rules, in order to be effective, must be enforced. A second reason is that fiscal 
outcomes are the product of both policy and endogenous economic developments; hence 
what appears to be good compliance with a rule may just be the result of lucky economic 
conditions. It is necessary to separate the two to see whether or not a rule has changed 
government policy.    
In this paper, we review the experience with fiscal rules in Europe and Japan. We 
begin with a review of the genesis and the substance of these rules in more detail. Next, we 
consider the performance of fiscal policy under these rules in terms of public spending, 
deficits, and debt. We show that the fiscal rule in Japan appeared to have some effects 
during the 1980s, but these effects disappeared with the end of the bubble economy. As it 
turned out, the control of spending based on a rule restricting General Account Spending 
was largely an illusion. In the EU, the effectiveness of the fiscal rules was very variable 
across countries during the 1990s, with some countries showing significant improvements in 
fiscal performance, others not. We develop a measure of discretionary fiscal policy and show 
that the fiscal rules in the EU lead to a suppression of the political business cycle in fiscal 
policy in the years between the signing of the Maastricht Treaty and the beginning of EMU. 
Once EMU had started, the pre-1990s pattern of political business cycles reemerged. In 
Japan, no political business cycle existed when the LDP dominated the political system. 
Since the early 1990s, the emergence of a more competitive party system led to the 
emergence of a very powerful political business cycle. 
Fiscal rules must be considered within the broader context of budgeting institutions, 
which, as recent literature has shown, have important effects on fiscal performance and fiscal 
discipline. In Europe, several countries have used the Maastricht fiscal rules to strengthen 
their national budgeting institutions following the contract approach of fiscal governance. The 
countries that managed to do this show a better fiscal performance than others since the 
beginning of the monetary union.  Japan’s budgeting institutions, in contrast, remain 
relatively weak. Since the political system in Japan has become more competitive in the past 
15 years, the contract approach to fiscal governance would be appropriate for Japan, too. A 
stronger fiscal rule could be a part of that, but other changes in the country’s budgeting 
institutions are required to make such a rule effective.    
  
1. Introduction 
The past two decades have seen a growing interest in fiscal rules. Fiscal rules specify 
numerical targets for key budgetary aggregates such as annual government deficits, debts, 
or spending.1 In contrast to monetary policy rules, the targets are generally understood as 
upper limits, i.e., staying below them is not considered to be a problem. Fiscal rules have a 
long history at the sub-national level (e.g., von Hagen and Eichengreen, 1996), and some 
countries including Japan and Germany have had less specific rules such as the “Golden 
Rule,” which limits government borrowing to investment spending, at the national level for a 
long time. What is new is the application of specific annual targets at the national level. It has 
been part of the reaction to the rapid rise in debt levels and the emergence of unsustainable 
deficits following the breakdown of the Bretton Woods System and the oil crises on the 
1970s in many countries around the world. Thus, the goal of fiscal rules is to improve fiscal 
discipline and reduce government deficits and debts. 
The Fiscal Consolidation Agreement adopted in Japan in 1981 is an early example of 
a fiscal rule. The agreement set annual targets for the increase in major spending 
aggregates; for details see below. In 1996, the Japanese government adopted a new rule 
under the Fiscal Restructuring Targets, and in 1997, the Fiscal Structural Reform Act was 
passed, which set annual spending targets for several years. The US Congress adopted a 
fiscal rule in the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act (Gramm-Rudman-
Hollings Act I) of 1985, which established numerical targets for the federal budget deficit for 
every fiscal year through 1991. These targets were later revised and extended by the 
Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Reaffirmation Act of 1987 (Gramm-
Rudman-Hollings Act II), which effectively postponed the goal of balancing the budget from 
1991 to 1993. The Budget Enforcement Act of 1990 eliminated the deficit targets and 
replaced them by nominal ceilings on annual discretionary spending. The same act also 
introduced a number of reforms of the annual budget process to strengthen the enforcement 
of the targets (Peach, 2001). In Europe, the Maastricht Treaty introduced fiscal rules for the 
member states of the European Union (EU) through the Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP), 
which was later strengthened and complemented by the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).  
 The government of Canada enacted fiscal targets for 1991-92 to 1995-96 through 
the Federal Spending Control Act (Kennedy and Robbins, 2001). These targets limited 
annual spending under all federal programs except those that are self-financing. In New 
Zealand, the Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1994 set out principles of prudent fiscal 
management promoting accountability and long-term fiscal planning. Although the Act does 
not require this explicitly, New Zealand governments have defined specific numerical targets 
                                                
1 For a discussion of general principles and the design of fiscal rules see Kopits and 
Symansky (1998) and Buiter (2003).  
for public debt under the new fiscal regime. Similarly, the Australian government has 
operated under self-imposed targets for net public debt since 1998 (Kennedy and Robbins, 
2001; Hemming and Kell, 2001). In Switzerland, a constitutional amendment was passed in 
1998 requiring the federal government to balance the budget by 2001 and to set annual 
ceilings for federal government expenditures afterwards.2 The Convergence, Stability, 
Growth, and Solidarity Pact adopted by the member countries of the West African Economic 
and Monetary Union also contains numerical limits for certain fiscal aggregates  (Dore and 
Masson, 2002).   
The attractiveness of fiscal rules as a way to contain the spending and deficit biases 
of democratic governments is due to the apparent simplicity of a rules-based framework. 
Once the rule is in place, it seems straightforward to measure the government’s performance 
against it. But in practice, it is by no means clear that fiscal rules are effective.3 A first reason 
is that rules, in order to be effective, must be enforced. A second reason is that fiscal 
outcomes are the product of both policy and endogenous economic developments; hence 
what appears to be good compliance with a rule may just be the result of lucky economic 
conditions. It is necessary to separate the two to see whether or not a rule has changed 
government policy.    
In this paper, we review the experience with fiscal rules in Europe and Japan. In 
section 2, we briefly explain the genesis and the substance of these rules in more detail. In 
section 3, we analyze the fiscal performance of the EU countries and Japan under their 
respective fiscal rules, looking at fiscal performance in terms of budgetary aggregates and a 
measure of discretionary fiscal policy. We show that the fiscal rules in the EU have had some 
impact of discretionary fiscal policy before the start of the European Monetary Union (EMU). 
In section 4, we widen the scope of the analysis and consider the connection between fiscal 
rules and the institutional design of the budget process. Based on the European experience, 
we distinguish between soft rules and hard rules. Soft rules consist of a mere declaration of 
annual targets for key budgetary parameters. Hard rules add to this a design of the budget 
process that strengthens the government’s ability to achieve these targets. We show that the 
EU fiscal rules have contributed to improving budgetary institutions in those countries where 
the political environment is appropriate for a rules-based approach to fiscal discipline. 
However, this is not the case in all EU countries, and especially not in the large EMU 
economies. Section 5 concludes by considering some changes in the Japanese budget 
process that would strengthen the fiscal rule in Japan.  
                                                
2 The UK also adopted a fiscal “rule” in the late 1990s. However, this rule is much less specific 
than those discussed above. See e.g. Kennedy and Robbins (2001) and Emmerson and Frayne 
(2002). Daban et al. provide a description of fiscal rules in a variety of countries.   
3 Canova and Pappa (2004) investigate the effectiveness of fiscal rules prevailing in most 
states of the US and conclude that they contribute little to fiscal discipline. 
 2. Fiscal Rules in Japan and the EU    
2.1. Fiscal Rules in Japan 
 The Fiscal Consolidation Agreement was negotiated between the Japanese Ministry 
of Finance (MoF) and the ruling Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) as part of the public sector 
reform initiated in 1980.4 The overall goal was to issue no more deficit bonds by 1990, i.e. to 
return to the traditional Japanese practice of limiting deficit financing to capital expenditures.5 
To achieve this goal the MoF issued a ceiling of zero growth for all agency budget requests 
in its budget guidelines for 1982. This ceiling was tightened to actual reductions in nominal 
general account spending in several years during the 1980s. Importantly, the ceiling only 
applied to the budget bids of the spending ministries and agencies for the general account, 
the focal point of Japanese budgetary policies. General account transfers to local 
governments were exempt from the ceiling, as were entitlement spending and debt service. 
Furthermore, the ceilings did not cover the many special accounts, through which the 
Japanese government receives revenues and spends money. In recent years, general 
account spending accounted for 18-20 percent of gross total government spending through 
the combined General Account and the Special Accounts and 32-40 percent of total 
spending net of transfers between the general and the special accounts.6 Thus, the fiscal rule 
was only a partial one.  
 Table 1 offers an overview of the fiscal targets. Several points are noteworthy. First, 
the targets were relatively simple during the 1980s and became increasingly complex in the 
1990s. 
                                                
4 This reform was the task the Second Provisional Commission for Administrative Reform, 
Rincho. For a detailed description of Rincho’s work and achievements see Wright (2002). 
5 Capital expenditures can be financed by issuing construction bonds.  
6 Tanaka (2003). Ishi (2000), as many Japanese public finance economists, argues that the 
General Account is still the most important one, as it controls all of the Special Accounts. The 
reasoning behind this view is that spending through special accounts can be influenced by controlling 
transfers from the General Account. Obviously, this claim relies heavily on the emphasis on marginal 
budgeting which prevails in Japan.  
Second, the targets throughout refer to certain functional categories of spending such as 
current versus investment spending or individual types of current spending, rather than to 
administrative categories that can be linked to individual ministries and branches of the 
government. By facing all branches of government with the same constraints, the MoF 
wished to emphasize the fairness of the targets (Grimes, 2000). Since one should expect 
that different branches of government have different shares of investment and current 
spending, which implies that the constraints created unequal ceilings for their total 
allocations, it is not clear that this fairness goal was really achieved. At the same time, the 
absence of a clear correspondence between the targets and the administrative 
responsibilities within government probably made it more difficult for the MoF to hold 
individual spending ministries accountable for surpassing the limits implied by the rule. Third, 
the targets were defined in terms of the annual increase in the budget allocations, focusing 
the policy process on marginal changes in the budget rather than the size of each ministry’s 
claim for resources.    
 During the 1980s, compliance with the fiscal targets was generally good in the sense 
that the budget bids of the spending departments were in line with the ceilings imposed 
(Grimes, 2000). However, this strong compliance was to a significant extent an illusion, as 
the actual growth of public spending and the actual deficits tended to exceed the targets. 
Japan’s fiscal performance deteriorated rapidly after the burst of the bubble economy in 1991 
and the subsequent beginning of a prolonged recession. In December 1996, the Japanese 
cabinet adopted the “Fiscal Restructuring Targets,” which aimed at reducing the deficit to 
below three percent of GDP and at ending the issuing of deficit-financing bonds no later than 
2005. The “5 Principles for Reform of the Fiscal Structure,” announced in March 1997, 
brought that target date forward to 2003. The “Fiscal Structure Reform Act,” enacted in 
November 1997, fixed the target year to 2003 and called for numerical targets for the most 
important spending categories in the subsequent budget years. It foresaw the reduction of 
the general government-debt to GDP ratio to 60 percent and the reduction of the general 
government deficit to GDP ratio to three percent (Ihori et al. 2000). However, responding to 
the onset of a severe recession, this act was amended already in March 1998, pushing back 
the target year to 2005 and allowing for greater flexibility in issuing deficit bonds. Although 
the act was suspended in December 1998, the MoF continued to issue annual guidelines for 
the budget bids that contain annual targets for different spending categories.  
In June 2001, the Japanese Cabinet adopted a new set of “basic policies for 
macroeconomic management,” including a commitment to turn the primary deficit into a 
surplus after 2004. In January 2002, the Cabinet adopted the “Structural Reform and 
Medium-Term Economic and Fiscal Perspective” which limited the issue of new government 
bonds in Fiscal Year 2002 to Yen 30 trillion and determined that primary budget surpluses 
should be reached in the early 2010s. In addition, the “Perspective” set out a target for 
government spending, i.e. to hold the ratio of government spending to GDP constant at its 
2002 level until 2006 (MoF, 2003; Shiokawa, 2003; Tanaka, 2003). In view of the continued 
weakness of the economy, however, the goal concerning new bond issues was abandoned 
in December 2002, and the limit for new bond issues in 2003 was raised to Yen 34.6 trillion 
(Tanaka, 2003).  
 
2.2. Fiscal Rules in Europe: The Excessive Deficit Procedure and the Stability and Growth 
Pact     
Several member states of the European Union (EU), most notably Denmark, Ireland, 
and the Netherlands, embarked on fiscal consolidation programs based on numerical targets 
for the main budgetary aggregates already in the 1980s (von Hagen, 1992). Fiscal targets 
became relevant for all EU member states through the adoption of the Maastricht Treaty. The 
Treaty calls upon the member states to avoid “excessive deficits” and establishes the 
Excessive Deficit Procedure (EDP). Under this procedure, states with general government 
deficits below 3 percent of GDP and general government debt below 60 percent of GDP are 
assumed not to have excessive deficits. If a country violates one of these numerical 
thresholds, however, an assessment procedure is started to determine whether or not an 
excessive deficit prevails. The Treaty provides for a number of excuses such as a severe 
recession or other exceptional circumstances as well as the temporariness of the violation. 
The assessment is conducted by the European Commission, which submits its report and 
proposal to the European Council of Finance Ministers (ECOFIN). ECOFIN then decides 
whether or not an excessive deficit exists. If this is the case, ECOFIN can admonish the 
government concerned first confidentially and then publicly, and, ultimately, impose a 
financial fine. ECOFIN can abrogate its decisions under the EDP upon a recommendation 
from the Commission. All ECOFIN decisions in this context are made by qualified majority; 
once a country has been found to have an excessive deficit, its votes are not counted in 
these decisions. All EU member states had to adopt unified public sector accounting rules 
and standards to assure that the functioning of the EDP is not undermined by creative 
accounting and data manipulation.  During the run-up to EMU, EU member states were 
obliged to submit Convergence Reports to the European Commission explaining how they 
intended to achieve the targets or maintain their deficits and debts below the critical values.  
 To become members of EMU, countries had to stay below the limits for general 
government deficits and debts defined by the EDP. The threat of not qualifying for EMU gave 
the fiscal rules considerable power between 1992 and 1998. By 1994, ECOFIN had declared 
all EU member states except Luxembourg as having excessive deficits. These declarations 
were revoked by 1997. The decision of which countries qualified for EMU was taken in 1998 
on the basis of 1997 fiscal data.  
To further appease the worries of the German public about fiscal profligacy in EMU, 
the EU member states in 1995 adopted the SGP, parts of which were incorporated into the 
Amsterdam Treaty in 1997. The SGP modifies the EDP in several ways. First, it sets up an 
early warning system strengthening the surveillance of the public finances of the member 
states. Under the SGP, EMU member states submit annual Stability Programs to the 
European Commission explaining their intended fiscal policies and, in particular, how they 
plan to keep the budget close to the new and stricter medium-term objective of “close to 
balance or in surplus.” Based on information and assessments by the European Commission 
ECOFIN can issue early warnings to countries that risk significant deviations from the fiscal 
targets set out in their Stability Programs. Second, the SGP clarifies the EDP by giving more 
specific content to the notions of exceptional and temporary breaches of the three-percent 
limit and by defining the rules for financial penalties, and it speeds up the process by setting 
specific deadlines for the individual steps. Third, the SGP gives political guidance to the 
parties involved in the EDP, calling upon them to implement the rules of the EDP effectively 
and timely. It commits the Commission in particular to using its right of initiative under the 
EDP “in a manner that facilitates the strict, timely, and effective functioning of the SGP.” This 
puts severe limits on the Commission’s right to exercise judgment on each individual case 
and situation, shifting that right to ECOFIN instead.  
 The rules of the SGP have been further developed in a set of ECOFIN decisions 
regarding the format and content of the Stability Programs.7 In October 1998, ECOFIN 
endorsed a “code of conduct” specifying criteria to be observed in the assessment of a 
country’s medium-term budgetary position and data standards and requirements for the 
Programs. In October 1999, ECOFIN recommended stricter compliance with and more timely 
updating of the Programs. In July 2001, ECOFIN endorsed an appended code of conduct 
refining the format and the use of data in the Stability Programs, including the use of a 
common set of assumptions about economic developments outside the EMU. Meanwhile, 
the Commission (2000) has specified a detailed framework for the interpretation of 
divergences from the targets set in the Stability Programs. 
 Somewhat ironically, Germany, the very country that had pushed for tighter fiscal 
rules in EMU in the mid-1990s, was the second EMU member country only and the first of 
the large member countries to violate the fiscal rules. Already in January 2002, the 
Commission recommended that ECOFIN should issue an early warning to Germany, but, in 
view of the upcoming federal elections there, ECOFIN refrained from doing that. In January 
2003, only four months after the elections, ECOFIN found that Germany did have an 
                                                
7 See European Commission (2002), p. 23 
excessive deficit. ECOFIN also issued an early warning to the French government in January 
2003, and declared that France, the Netherlands, and Greece had excessive deficits in June 
2003, June 2004, and July 2004, respectively. In July 2004, ECOFIN also found that several 
of the new member states that entered the EU in May of the year had excessive deficits, i.e., 
the Czech Republic, Cyprus, Hungary, Malta, Poland, and the Slovak Republic. Meanwhile, 
the governments of Germany, France, and other countries demanded a reform of the SGP 
and the EDP allowing for more flexibility.8 In December 2004, ECOFIN decided to suspend 
the ongoing procedures under the EDP until a reform of the SGP has been adopted. In 
March 2005, the European Council adopted an explicit list of excuses for persistent 
government deficits and debts in excess of the thresholds set by the EDP. This decision 
further deprives the European Commission of its right to exert independent judgment on the 
fiscal performance of the EU member states and effectively marks the end of the rules-based 
regime for fiscal policy in Europe. 
 
3. Fiscal Performance Under Fiscal Rules 
3.1. Government Debt, Deficits and Spending  
The main goal of the Fiscal Consolidation Agreement was to stabilize Japan’s 
government debt ratio, which had been rising rapidly during the 1970s. Table 2 shows the 
evolution of the Japanese general government debt ratio from 1980 to 2003. The ratio 
hovered around 60 percent in the early 1980s, and jumped to about 70 percent in 1983. The 
ratio peaked in 1987 at 76 percent and then fell substantially until 1990. This apparent 
success of the fiscal rule may in fact be due to the very vigorous economic growth during 
those years. Once the bubble economy collapsed, the debt ratio started rising again rapidly. 
In 2003, it reached 157.6 percent, the largest value of any country in the OECD. Apart from 
1986-1991, all sub-periods shown in the table had positive average annual changes in the 
debt ratio.9    
Table 3 shows the corresponding ratios of general government budget surpluses to 
GDP. The budget balance turned from substantial deficits in the first years of the 1980s to 
surpluses during the second half of that decade. During the years of the bubble economy, 
the Japanese government achieved average surpluses of 2.5 percent of GDP.  This benign 
picture changed rapidly after 1992, when the economy entered into the prolonged recession. 
Deficits grew quickly to levels comparable to the early 1980s. In 1997, the government 
managed to reduce the deficit by 1.3 percent of GDP. Since then, deficits have grown again 
and have reached levels over seven percent of GDP in most recent years. 
                                                
8 See Fatas et al (2003) for a review of the reform debate and proposals. 
Table 4 reports the ratio of general government spending to GDP. It paints a more 
critical picture of Japanese fiscal policy under the fiscal rule of the late 1980s. The table 
shows that the expenditure ratio still grew until 1984. Although it fell slightly between 1984 
and 1989, this does not mean that government spending had been brought under control. 
With GDP growth rates above seven percent in these years, general government spending 
was rising fast even with a declining expenditure ratio, and this despite the tight limits on 
nominal spending imposed on the general accounts budget. As Wright (1999) puts it, the 
control of total government spending through the fiscal targets constraining the general 
account was largely an illusion. If the budget ended up in surplus nevertheless, this must be 
attributed mainly to strong growth in tax revenues during these years.  
When the economy slowed down in the early 1990s, revenues slowed down, too, and 
the deficit problem reemerged. At the same time, the expenditure ratio started climbing again 
already in 1990. The experience thus confirms a key result of recent research into the 
conditions of successful consolidation, namely that fiscal consolidations relying mainly on 
rising revenues tend not to last long (Perotti, Strauch and von Hagen, 1998). Between 1980 
and 1985, the primary surplus ratio improved from (-1.3) percent to 3.9 percent of GDP, while 
primary spending fell from 29.4 percent to 27.8 percent of GDP. Between 1986 and 1991, the 
primary surplus ratio rose from 3.5 percent to 6.8 percent of GDP, while primary spending fell 
from 28.1 percent to 27.7 percent. Thus, primary spending contributed no more than a third 
of the total to the fiscal consolidation in the first half of the 1980s, and only 12 percent in the 
second half. Perotti et al. (1998) suggest that consolidation episodes in OECD countries are 
typically unsuccessful unless the decline in the spending ratio contributes at least 50 percent 
to the improvement in the surplus ratio. In recent years the government has succeeded in 
stabilizing the spending ratio around 39 percent of GDP, not enough to bring it close to the 
revenue ratio. In 2003, the goal of holding the spending ratio constant at its 2002 level, was 
achieved.10  
 Figure 1 illustrates an important aspect of Japan’s fiscal performance under the fiscal 
rule. The figure shows the difference between initial and actual (final) general account 
spending and deficits for each fiscal year between 1975 and 2003. Initial spending and 
deficits refer to the levels determined by the original budget law of each year, while actual 
spending and deficits refer to the final budgetary outcomes. Both are measured in percent of 
initial spending for each year. Since the focus of the Japanese fiscal targets was on spending 
growth rather than levels, the figure also shows the difference between actual and initial 
                                                                                                                                                     
9 The definition of the sub-periods in this and the following tables tries to separate out the 
period of the bubble economy for Japan, and the period from the signing of the Maastricht Treaty to 
the start of EMU for Europe.   
10 Preliminary data suggests that the spending ratio in 2004 was kept at 38.2 percent of GDP, 
which is consistent with the target. 
spending growth rates. Deviations between the actual and the initial budget figures are due 
mainly to the revisions of the annual budget which the governments enacted in 
supplementary budgets each year. The figure shows that the deviations were particularly 
large in the second half of the 1980s. Actual spending was significantly larger than initial 
spending during the years from 1987 to 1991. This and the fact that the deficit turned out 
lower than expected during these years confirms the point that the consolidation was more 
due to the strong surge in tax revenues and less to a fiscal policy guided closely by fiscal 
targets.  
Large relative deviations between actual and initial spending also occurred in 1995 
and 1998 – 2001. In contrast to the late 1980s, actual deficits were also typically much larger 
than initial deficits in the 1990s. The figure also shows that years in which actual spending 
exceeded initial spending by a large amount (1987, 1993, 1995, 1998) were often followed 
by years in which the difference between actual and initial spending growth fell, while the 
difference in levels remained high. This reflects the MoF’s focus on the growth rate rather 
than the level of spending as the control variable. Note that the two lines virtually coincide, if 
initial spending growth is defined as initial spending in year t relative to actual spending in 
year t-1. This suggests that the annual limits for spending growth allowed for base drift in the 
sense that the limits for year t did not account for overspending in year t-1. In sum, the figure 
illustrates the illusion of exerting control over general government spending and deficits 
through constraints imposed on the general account budget bids. Even if these constraints 
were able to contain initial budget bids, their effect was apparently undone each year in the 
supplementary budgets.   
 We now turn to fiscal performance in the EU. Table 2 shows the evolution of general 
government debt in the EU since 1985. Here and in the following tables “EUR-12” stands for 
the  
weighted average of the countries participating in the monetary union. In 1992, the EU’s 
average debt ratio was close to 60 percent – hence the 60 percent limit foreseen in the 
Maastricht Treaty. The debt ratio of the EMU member states climbed in the following years to 
peak at 75.2 percent in 1996. In 1997, the year whose fiscal data were the basis for the May 
1998 decision which countries could enter the monetary union, it still stood at 75 percent. By 
2001, the average debt ratio had fallen to 69.4 percent, but in most recent years it has 
started to increase again. Judged from average performance, therefore, EMU countries did 
not reduce their debt ratio over the last decade and the data suggest that the process for 
fiscal consolidation that started with the Maastricht Treaty was rather unsuccessful.  
Behind this average performance, however, are very different patterns of individual 
countries. First, we note that a few countries already managed to reduce their debt ratios 
during the second half of the 1980s, i.e., Denmark, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal, Sweden, 
and the UK. Between 1991 and 1998, Belgium and the Netherlands joined that group, while 
the UK experienced significant growth in the debt ratio again. Germany, France, and Spain 
showed increases of their debt ratios by over 20 percent, the UK and Italy by 16 percent 
between 1991 and 1998. Thus, the fiscal rule imposed by the Maastricht Treaty seems to 
have done very little to stabilize the debt ratio especially in the large economies of the EU. 
The sharp increases in the debt ratios of Sweden and Finland in the early 1990s were due to 
the severe financial and economic crises these countries went through in the early 1990s. 
Their debt ratios peaked before these countries became subject to the Maastricht rule in 
1995.11 Similarly, the increase in the Austrian ratio occurred before that country joined the 
EU.  Second, between 1998 and 2001 the average debt ratio in the EMU came down by 4.7 
percent.  Considering that this period was one of strong economic growth, this is no big 
achievement. Again, there are very different performances behind this average. The debt 
ratios of France, Germany, and Portugal rose over the five years from 1999 to 2003, while 
Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden and the UK achieved further, 
significant reductions.   
Table 3 shows that all EU countries except Greece and Austria already saw 
improvements in their budget balances in the second half of the 1980s, when economic 
growth had improved in Europe. Ireland, Belgium, Portugal and Sweden saw the strongest 
improvements comparing the averages from 1986-1991 with those from 1980-1985. In 
contrast, comparing the average surplus ratios from 1992-1998 with those from 1986-1991 
reveals that only five states achieved improvements after the adoption of the Maastricht 
Treat, i.e., Belgium, Greece, Ireland, Italy, and the Netherlands. The larger states, Germany, 
France, Spain, and the UK all had increasing deficits relative to GDP during this period.  
Average deficits generally improved after 1998, but this may have been due to the strong 
                                                
11 Sweden, Finland and Austria joined the EU in 1995. 
economic growth during 1999-2000. As the European economies moved into a recession, 
surplus ratios began to fall again in most EU countries.  
Table 4 shows that Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, and the UK achieved a reduction 
in the average ratio of government spending to GDP comparing the years from 1992-1998 
with the first half of the 1980s. But the bulk of those reductions occurred during the 1980s, 
i.e., before the fiscal rule of the Maastricht Treaty was adopted. In contrast, Denmark, 
Germany, France, Austria, Portugal, Finland, and Sweden all had rising spending ratios 
comparing the years 1992- 1998 with the first half of the 1980s, and in these countries, most 
of the increase happened after the fiscal rule was adopted. Greece, Spain and Italy also had 
increasing spending ratios, but in these countries, most of the increase took place in the 
second half of the 1980s. Here, one might argue that the fiscal rule slowed down the growth 
of government spending relative to GDP.  Finally, after the start of EMU in 1999, average 
spending ratios came down in all EU countries except Portugal and, effectively, Germany. 
Looking at the individual years, however, indicates that after 1999-2000 spending ratios have 
begun to trend upwards again in all EU countries except Greece, Spain, and Austria. 
In sum, the experience with fiscal rules in the context of EMU is quite mixed. In 
particular, the rules seem to be much less effective in the larger states, Germany, France, 
Italy, and Spain, than in the small states of the EU. This is ironic, since it would make the 
framework most effective where it matters the least for the stability of the common currency.  
 
3.2. Discretionary Fiscal Policy 
Fiscal outcomes such as deficit ratios are determined both by fiscal policy and 
endogenous economic developments. As noted by Blöndal (2003, p. 8), annual economic 
growth rates are the most important determinants of fiscal performance in the short run. It is, 
therefore, necessary to separate the effects of policy from the effects of economic growth to 
see how much of the observed developments can be attributed to government policy as 
opposed to windfall gains and losses from strong economic growth and recessions. In this 
section, we use the growth-accounting approach proposed in Hughes-Hallett et al. (2001) for 
that purpose. Separating the effects of growth and policy requires some assumption about 
the economic growth to changes in this ratio. To do this, we start from the observed primary 
surplus ratio, s, for a given year:  
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where R denotes government revenues, G non-interest government spending, Y GDP, and 
r=R/Y, and g=G/Y. The annual change in this ratio is  
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We define a “neutral” fiscal policy as one that keeps the average tax rate and the volume of 
government spending unchanged over the previous year, i.e., rt = rt-1 and ΔGt =0.12 With this 
definition, the contribution of economic growth to the change in the surplus ratio is   
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Using this definition, we obtain the policy-induced change in the surplus ratio or the fiscal 
impulse as: 
.P gt t ts s sΔ = Δ −Δ          (4) 
This definition attributes any change in the average tax rate and all changes in government 
spending to fiscal policy. 13 We use this part as our indicator of discretionary fiscal policy, 
since it measures the active contribution of any policy actions to observed changes in the 
deficit ratio. Note that a positive value indicates a discretionary fiscal contraction, while a 
negative value indicates a discretionary fiscal expansion.  
 Table 5 reports the averages and standard deviations of the fiscal impulses for the 
EU countries and Japan. The table bears a number of interesting observations. First, we note 
that in three EU countries, Belgium, Denmark, and Germany, the volatility of fiscal impulses 
was smaller after 1991 than before. In these countries, the Maastricht fiscal rule seems to 
have induced a smoother course of fiscal policy over time. For the remaining countries, 
however, we could not reject the hypothesis of equal variances. In the case of Japan, the 
volatility of fiscal impulses was significantly lower under the fiscal rule of the 1980s than after 
1991.  
Second, we find that the average fiscal impulse was larger in six EU countries in 
1992-2003 than in 1981-1991, and smaller in the other eight EU countries, indicating a less 
expansionary discretionary fiscal policy in the first and a more expansionary policy in the 
second group. Only in Ireland, however, the difference in means is statistically significant, 
and there, policy became more expansionary. This suggests that, to the extent that some EU 
countries achieved reductions in their deficit ratios in the 1990s, they benefited from the 
effects of economic growth rather than discretionary fiscal contractions. In Japan, the 
average fiscal impulse was significantly smaller in the 1990s than in the 1980s, reflecting a 
more expansionary discretionary fiscal policy. We also tested for differences in the means 
between 1981-85 and 1986-91, but the results were not significant. 
                                                
12 The assumption of a constant tax ratio is in line with empirical estimates of macro economic 
tax functions in OECD countries and does not contradict the fact that income taxes are progressive at 
the individual level.  
13 Alternatively, one might use the OECD’s cyclically adjusted budget balances. These 
estimates, however, are based on past data and policies. If the introduction of fiscal rules induced 
changes in the co-movements of cyclical output and budget balances, they could be quite misleading. 
Buti and van den Noord (2003, 2004) use a similar approach and come to similar conclusions 
regarding fiscal policy in the early years of EMU.  
Third, we find that the average fiscal impulse in 1999-2003 was more expansionary 
than the 1992-2003 average in all EU countries except Austria and Portugal. Thus, fiscal 
policy has became more expansionary in EU all countries except Austria and Portugal after 
the start of EMU in 1999. The changes are significant in eight EU countries, i.e., Belgium, 
Germany, Greece, France, Italy, Luxembourg, Sweden, and the UK. Note that this group 
includes all large countries except Spain. This is significant, as the threat of not making it into 
EMU due to lax fiscal policies was no longer pending over the European countries once EMU 
had started. Elsewhere, we have dubbed this observation “consolidation fatigue” (von Hagen 
and Harden, 1994). EU governments used the first chance for relaxing fiscal policy. In Japan, 
the average fiscal impulse did not change significantly after 1998. 
To gain some further insights into the conduct of fiscal policy in the EU, we now pool 
the fiscal impulses of all member states in a regression model. The data excludes 
Luxembourg, for which we do not have the fiscal data for all years of the 1980s. Table 6A 
reports the results for the period from 1981 to 1991. Our baseline model regresses the 
annual fiscal impulse on a constant, its own lag, the growth rate of GDP and the lagged ratio 
of government debt to GDP. We also include a “crisis” dummy accounting for the fiscal 
effects of the Swedish and Finnish crises in 1991. Country fixed effects were not significant 
and were dropped from the model. 
The table reveals some interesting properties of fiscal policy in the EU. First, the 
coefficient on the lagged fiscal impulse is negative, indicating that governments tend to 
reverse part of a given fiscal impulse in the following year. However, the coefficient is not 
statistically significant and we drop the lag from the model. Second, the coefficient on the 
lagged debt ratio is positive, indicating that discretionary policy reacts with a fiscal 
contraction to an increase in public debt relative to GDP. This can be regarded as a 
necessary condition for fiscal sustainability, as the debt ratio would be unbounded without 
such a reaction. The result also confirms the finding in Hughes Hallett et al. (2002) that the 
likelihood of fiscal consolidations in EU and OECD member states during the period from 
1960 to 1999 rises when the debt ratio increases. Third, the coefficient on real GDP growth is 
significantly negative indicating that discretionary fiscal policy tightens when output slows 
down and eases when output growth rises. This pro-cyclical pattern of discretionary fiscal 
policy in Europe is consistent with previous results.14 It suggests that governments 
systematically counteract automatic stabilizers built into the tax system. 
                                                
14 See e.g. Brunila and Martinez-Mongay (2002), IMF (2001a), Fonseca Marinheiro (2005). 
Buti and van den Noord (2004) find that their measure of the fiscal impulse is counter-cyclical, but they 
use output gaps rather than growth rates to measure cyclical effects. We also estimated fiscal 
impulses corrected for the trend in the ratio of government spending to GDP, approximating the trend 
by five-year moving averages. We did this to account for the fact that spending ratios generally 
trended downwards in the 1980s and 1990s in many EU countries. The interpretation then is that the 
trend is not part of annual discretionary fiscal policy. The main difference in the results compared to 
Political economy literature has long argued that governments use fiscal policy to 
enhance their chances of reelection. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) argue that incumbents 
increase spending and deficits during election years to signal their competence to the 
electorate. Shi and Svensson (2002) and Persson and Tabellini (2002, chapter 4) cast the 
argument into a career-concern model of democratic elections. In this model, voters elect an 
incumbent government, if they expect that the incumbent will deliver better policies in the 
periods after the election than his challenger. A government’s competence has a positive 
effect on the quantity of public goods and services that can be produced from a given 
amount of taxes. Voters cannot observe the government’s nor the challenger’s competence 
directly; but they can get an estimate of the incumbent’s competence from the observed 
supply of public goods and services. This creates an incentive for the incumbent to increase 
spending in an election period to signal a high level of competence. Shi and Svensson 
(2002) and Alt and Dreyer Lassen (2004) find empirical evidence of political budget cycles 
with deficits increasing in election years. In light of these arguments, we add a dummy 
“election” to our model which is one in election years and zero in all other years.15 The result 
is reported as model 3 in table 6A. The election dummy has a coefficient of (-0.89), which is 
statistically highly significant. It indicates that EU governments in the 1980s undertook 
discretionary fiscal expansions during election years. Including the election dummy leaves 
the other results of the model largely unchanged. 
Table 6B presents a similar analysis for the 1990s. Again, we start by regressing 
fiscal impulses on an own lag, the lagged debt-GDP ratio and the real GDP growth rate. As 
in the 1980s, fiscal impulses are not persistent over time. Thus, we drop the lagged fiscal 
impulse in model 2. As before, the lagged debt ratio appears with a significant, positive 
coefficient, i.e., the sufficient condition for sustainability continues to hold. Note that the 
coefficients on the lagged debt ratio are very similar in the 1980s and 1990s, and are not 
statistically different from each other. Thus, the fiscal rules of the 1990s did not affect the 
governments’ adjustment to a build-up of government debt. Finally, the fiscal impulses 
remained pro-cyclical in the 1990s. 
Next, we add an “EMU” dummy to the model, which is zero for all years from 1991 to 
1998 and one starting in 1999. Table 6B shows that this dummy has a coefficient of (-0.73), 
which is statistically significant. This confirms the hypothesis of consolidation fatigue: Once 
the threat of not making it into EMU because of excessive deficits was relieved, fiscal policy 
became more expansionary in the EU. Note that, given the pro-cyclicality of discretionary 
                                                                                                                                                     
those of tables 6A (and 6B) is that the lagged debt ratio no longer appears with a positive coefficient. 
That is, the negative trend in the spending ratio reflects the governments’ reaction to the positive trend 
in the debt ratios.   
15 The election dates from 1981 to 1991 are taken from Lijphardt’s Elections Archive 
(www.dodgson.ucsc.edu/lij) and from the reports on “National Elections” in various issues of Electoral 
Studies. Post-1991 election dates are  taken from www.cnn.com/world/election.watch  
fiscal policy observed before, this fiscal expansion cannot be explained by the weak 
economic performance of the EU economies after the year 2000. Note, also, that the 
intercept of Model 3 is smaller in absolute value than the intercept of Model 2 in table 6A. 
This suggests that discretionary fiscal policy was less expansionary than in the 1980s before 
the start of EMU. Hence, the fiscal rules seem to have had some effect in the desired 
direction between 1991 and 1998, when the penalty for exceeding the deficit limits was large. 
Finally, we note that including the EMU dummy raises the p-value of the lagged debt ratio 
somewhat.16 
Next, we include the election dummy in the model. Since our previous results indicate 
that the EU fiscal rules lost bite after 1998, we interact this dummy with the EMU dummy. 
Thus, the coefficient on the election dummy picks up any election-year effect on discretionary 
fiscal policy between 1992 and 1998, while the sum of the coefficients on the election dummy 
and the interactive dummy picks up the effect of elections on discretionary fiscal policy since 
the start of EMU. Model 4 in table 6B has the results. The coefficient on the election dummy 
has a positive sign, but it is not statistically significant. In contrast, the coefficient on the 
interactive dummy has a negative sign and is statistically significant. This suggests that, 
since EMU started, governments have systematically run fiscal expansions during elections 
years. This result is consistent with similar findings in Buti and van den Noord (2004).17 
However, including the election dummy and the interactive dummy also results in the 
EMU dummy loosing its statistical significance. In view of that, we drop the EMU dummy from 
this regression, retaining only the election dummy and the interactive dummy. The results are 
reported as Model 5 in table 6B. The election dummy now has a positive coefficient with a p-
value of 0.055, the interactive dummy a negative coefficient with a p-value below 0.01. The 
model thus indicates that governments embarked on fiscal contractions during election years 
between 1992 and 1998. Since the start of EMU, election years are characterized again by 
discretionary fiscal expansions. Since the EMU dummy was not significant in Model 4, this 
result suggests that the difference between the pre-EMU and the EMU period is mainly in the 
electoral effects. The sum of the coefficients on the election dummy and the interactive EMU 
and election dummy is (-0.93), which is very close to the coefficient on the election dummy in 
model 3 of table 6A. Thus, the typical effect of elections on EU government budgets is the 
same in the period from 1999 to 2003 as it was during the 1980s.  
                                                
16 We also estimated a model interacting the EMU dummy with the lagged debt ratio and the 
real GDP growth rate. Neither interactive term had a significant coefficient. Nevertheless, the 
coefficient on the interacted lagged debt ratio was positive and the coefficient on the lagged debt ratio 
itself was 0.011 with a p-value of 0.06.   
17 Preliminary results reported in von Hagen (2003) using data up to 2001 suggested that the 
election effects are stronger in pre-election years than in election years. Controlling for election-year 
effects, we do not find pre-election year effects in our sample. This, too, is consistent with Buti and van 
den Noord (2004).  
The empirical results thus indicate that governments undertook discretionary fiscal 
contractions rather than expansions in election years between 1992 and 1998, and 
discretionary fiscal expansions in election years since the start of EMU. This pattern is 
consistent with the career-concern model of the political business cycle, if one assumes that 
voters put a high priority on joining EMU during the 1990s. As long as EMU membership was 
not secured, voters rewarded signals of fiscal discipline as the latter would increase the 
chances of getting into the monetary union. Governments, therefore, had an incentive to 
undertake discretionary fiscal contractions in election years in order to look tough, and they 
did. Once EMU membership was secured, the old pattern of political budget cycles 
reemerged.  
This result indicates that the fiscal rules of the EMU framework affected government 
behavior as long as voters put a high priority on fiscal discipline. This suggests that the 
electoral process is critical in enforcing fiscal rules at the national level. For fiscal rules to be 
effective, voters must be aware of the rules and perceive that violating them would carry a 
significant cost. Thus, the framework setting up the rules must have sufficient visibility and 
breaking the rules must have consequences voters care about. This seems not to be the 
case in the EU after the start of the monetary union.     
Table 6C presents the results of estimating a similar model for Japan, using the years 
from 1981 to 2003.18 As in the case of the EU countries, we found no significant effect of the 
lagged fiscal impulse and dropped the lag from the model. This leaves three explanatory 
variables, the lagged debt ratio, real GDP growth, and a dummy for elections to the House of 
Representatives.19 Furthermore, we introduce a dummy variable which is one for all years 
after 1992 and zero elsewhere. Selecting 1992 as the breakpoint is suggested by the fact 
that the fiscal impulse of 1992 is much larger in absolute value than the values of previous 
years, and that 1992 marks the fiscal adjustments to the incipient recession in Japan. In 
model 1 of table 6C, we interact this dummy both with the real GDP growth rate and the 
election dummy. 
Our results show, first, that the lagged debt ratio enters the model with a positive 
coefficient. This means that the necessary condition for fiscal sustainability holds. Japanese 
governments have reacted to an increase in the debt ratio by tightening discretionary fiscal 
policy.20 Second, like discretionary fiscal policy in the EU, Japan’s discretionary fiscal policy 
was pro-cyclical from 1981-1991, as indicated by the negative coefficient on GDP growth. 
After 1991, however, the combined coefficients on GDP growth become significantly positive, 
                                                
18 See Claeys (2005) for a similar estimate of a “fiscal rule” in Japan.  
19 We also tried an election dummy for elections to the House of Councillors which did not turn 
out to be significant. This may be due to the fact that the stakes in House of Councillors elections are 
lower since each election turns over only half of the seats in the Upper House. 
20 We tested for a break in this parameter in 1992 but found no evidence for it. 
i.e., discretionary fiscal policy expands when output growth falls. Third, the election dummy 
has a negative coefficient, but it’s p-value is above 0.13, i.e., it lacks statistical significance. 
In contrast, the interactive election dummy which captures the electoral effects after 1992 is 
negative and highly statistically significant. 
Going from model 1 to model 3, we drop the real GDP growth rate and the election 
dummy, retaining the effects of these two only for years after 1991. Doing so is not rejected 
by an F-test at conventional significance levels. Our preferred estimate is model 3. This 
model shows that Japanese discretionary fiscal policy in the years after 1991 differed 
significantly from discretionary policy under the fiscal rule of the 1980s in three respects. 
First, it became much more expansionary on average. This is indicated by the post-1991 
dummy. Second, it became countercyclical, as shown by the significantly positive coefficient 
on GDP growth after 1991. Third, it became much more expansionary in election years. 
These results are consistent with the finding, reported above, that the average fiscal impulse 
and its standard deviation were smaller (in absolute value) under the fiscal rule of the 1980s 
than afterwards. They suggest that the fiscal rule of the 1980s did have an effect on 
discretionary fiscal policy.21       
 
 
4. Fiscal Rules and the Budget Process 
4.1. Political Economy 
Political economy literature argues that the institutional framework of the government 
budget process is an important determinant of a government’s fiscal performance; see von 
Hagen (2002, 2005) for reviews of the literature. Budgeting institutions encompass the formal 
and informal rules governing the drafting of the budget law, its passage through the 
legislature, and its implementation. These rules distribute strategic influence among the 
participants in the budget process and regulate the flow of information. In doing so, they have 
important effects on the outcomes of budgeting processes. The argument starts from the 
common pool externality of public budgeting. This externality results from the fact that 
government spending is commonly targeted at specific groups in society while being 
financed from a general tax fund. This incongruence implies that those who benefit from 
                                                
21 As pointed out by the referee, election dates for the House of Representatives can be 
manipulated by the government. This raises a potential endogeneity problem of the election dates in 
our regressions. Election dates in the period under consideration were 1993, 1996, 2000, and 2003. 
Since a maximum term is four years, this suggests that the 1996 dates were chosen early by the 
government for political convenience. Note that, if the government decided to move the elections 
forward before setting the fiscal impulse, the electoral effect on fiscal impulses still remains valid. To 
see whether the two dates mentioned are different, we set the election dummy equal to zero for these 
two years and augment the model by a dummy for 1996 and a dummy for 2003. The coefficient for the 
post-1991 election dummy remains unchanged, as do the coefficients on the other variables. The 
specific public policies typically only pay a fraction of the taxes used to finance these policies. 
Policy makers representing constituencies that benefit from specific policies without paying 
their full cost demand more of these policies than they would if their constituencies had to 
cover their full costs. As a result, government spending and, ultimately, taxes grow 
excessively large. Putting the argument into a dynamic context, one can show that the 
common pool externality causes excessive deficits and debts, too (Velasco, 1999; von 
Hagen and Harden, 1995).  
The core of this argument is that public budgeting involves a co-ordination failure 
among the relevant decision makers. Excessive spending and deficits can be avoided if the 
relevant policymakers recognize the externality and take a comprehensive view of the costs 
and benefits of all public policies. The political economy of government budgeting argues that 
the main function of the budget process is to induce the policymakers participating in 
budgeting decisions to take such a view. Hallerberg and von Hagen (1998) call a budget 
process fragmented, if it contains only few and weak institutional elements the decision 
makers to take a comprehensive view of the budget, and centralized, if it contains many and 
strong institutional elements doing that. They distinguish two basic institutional approaches to 
centralization: the delegation approach and the contracts approach. Under the delegation 
approach, the budget process vests one particular policymaker with significant strategic 
powers over the other participants. This is usually the finance minister who can be expected 
to take a comprehensive view of spending and taxing decisions, if he is responsible for the 
entire budget and since he is less bound by special interests than ministers heading 
spending departments. The delegation approach builds on the following key characteristics:  
• A finance minister vested with strong agenda-setting power relative to the remaining 
members of the executive; typically, this involves the right to make binding proposals 
for the broad budgetary categories and information advantages. 
• A finance minister vested with strong monitoring capacity in the implementation of the 
budget and the power to correct deviations from the budget plan, e.g., through cash 
limits and the requirement of disbursement approvals from the finance department; 
• A strong agenda-setting position of the executive relative to the legislature in the 
parliamentary phase of the budget process; this involves strict limitations on the 
scope of parliamentary amendments to the executive’s budget proposal and a limited 
role of the upper house of parliament in the process where applicable. 
Under the contracts approach, the budget process starts with negotiations among all 
members of the executive leading to a binding agreement on a set of key budgetary 
parameters, usually spending targets for each spending department. Here, it is the process 
                                                                                                                                                     
coefficient on the 1996 and 2003 elections dummies are very close to that on the other election 
dummy. We conclude that the potential endogeneity did not affect our estimates.  
of negotiation that causes the participants to recognize the common pool externality. The 
following features of the process characterize the contracts approach:  
• A strong emphasis on budgetary targets negotiated among all members of the 
executive at the beginning of the annual budget cycle and regarded as binding for all 
spending departments; often these targets are backed up by multi-annual fiscal 
programs as part of the coalition contract among the ruling parties. 
• A finance minister vested with strong monitoring and enforcement capacities in the 
implementation of the budget;  
• A weak position of the executive relative to the parliament exemplified by weak or no 
limits on parliamentary amendments to the budget proposal, and strong monitoring 
capacities of parliamentary committees overseeing the activities of individual 
departments of the executive.   
Under both approaches, transparency of the budget process is important to promote 
accountability and facilitate monitoring of all agents involved in it. 
To evaluate the importance of budgeting institutions for fiscal performance and 
discipline, von Hagen (1992) and von Hagen and Harden (1994, 1996) construct an index 
capturing the most important institutional features of the budget process in EU countries. The 
index is based on institutional data garnered from legal documents and questionnaires sent 
to finance ministry officials in 1990-1991. Hallerberg et al. (2002, 2004) computed the same 
index based on institutional data collected in 2000-2001. A large value on the index indicates 
the prevalence of strong elements of centralization in a country’s budget process. 
 Table 7 shows the index for a group of EU countries and Japan. The index is 
composed of four subcategories focusing on different stages and aspects of the budget 
process. The first item, budget negotiations, captures important characteristics of the budget 
planning stage in the executive branch of government. It is large, when the budget process 
imposes a quantitative constraint on total spending, the deficit, or government debt early on, 
when the finance minister has strong agenda setting powers relative to the other members of 
the executive, and when quantitative targets are set early and specifically for individual parts 
of the budget. The second item, parliamentary stage, focuses on the role of parliament in the 
budget process. It is large, when the executive has strong agenda setting powers over the 
legislature, when the legislature votes on an overall constraint on the budget first, and when 
there is a vote on total spending. The third item, informativeness, captures several aspects of 
the transparency of the budget process. It is large, if the budget is presented in one 
comprehensive document, if special funds are included in the budget, if a link is made to 
national account data, if loans of the government to non-government entities are reported in 
the budget, and if the respondents to the questionnaire judge the budget data as 
“transparent.” Finally, the fourth item, flexibility of execution, captures the main rules of the 
implementation of the budget law. It is large, if the budget law has strong binding power for 
the executive. This is the case if the finance minister has powerful instruments to prevent the 
spending ministers from overspending, if transfers of funds between parts of the budget and 
budgets of different fiscal years are limited, and if supplementary budgets are rare. The index 
is a weighted sum of the four items, with weights of 1.0, 0.8, 0.8, and 0.67 respectively. The 
weights assure that each item contributes the same maximum score to the index. 
 Table 7 reports the index for the four largest EU economies and Ireland, which is an 
example for a strong contracts approach in 2001. The table shows that France, the UK and 
Germany had much higher index values than Italy and Ireland in 1991. From table 2, we 
recall that they also had much smaller debt ratios in 1991, and, from table 3, smaller average 
deficit ratios over the 1980s than Ireland and Italy. Both Ireland and Italy undertook large 
improvements in their budgeting institutions between 1991 and 2001. Both now have index 
values above Germany’s, consistent with their better budgetary performance in recent years. 
The improvements concerned all four items of the institutional index in Italy, while, in Ireland, 
they concern mainly the structure of negotiations, the informativeness and the 
implementation stage of the budget.  
The index value for Japan is based on documents on the budget process obtained from 
the MoF in 2002 and on answers to the same questionnaire used for the EU countries 
provided by representatives of the MoF in 2002. The changes in the first item between the 
entries for 1991 and for 2001 reflect the presence of fiscal targets in the 1980s, which, as 
discussed above, lost force in the 1990s. Table 7 shows that the summary index of the 
Japanese budget process is comparable to those of Italy and Ireland in 1991, both countries 
with weak fiscal performances in the 1980s. 
The low score of Japan on the first item is due to the absence of a general quantitative 
constraint on the budget negotiations during the planning stage of the budget and the weak 
agenda-setting power of the MoF. Above, we have already pointed out the partial nature of 
the targets for the general account. The role of the MoF in the negotiations is undermined by 
the involvement not only of spending ministers but also of politicians from the ruling parties in 
the budget negotiations. The final cabinet decision must be made unanimously, which gives 
each spending minister veto power and further weakens the MoF’s influence. The low score 
on the second item reflects the strong position of the parliament against the executive in 
Japan. There are no formal limits on amendments to the budget proposal, nor rules requiring 
that amendments leave the overall balance or total spending unchanged. The understanding 
that a rejection of the budget law can cause the government to fall gives the executive some 
strategic power. Parliament does not take a vote on the budget total as in other countries. 
OECD (2002) also points to the weak institutions at the parliamentary stage of the Japanese 
budget process. 
Table 7 shows that the Japanese budget process scores very low on the third item, the 
informativeness or transparency of the budget process. This reflects the importance of 
special funds pointed out above, the lack of a unified budget document, the lack of links to 
national accounting concepts, and the fact that government loans to non-government entities 
are reported in documents separate from the budget. The opacity of the Japanese budget 
process is also documented in Alt and Dreyer Lassen (2004) and OECD (2002).  
Interestingly, the fourth item, which concerns the implementation phase of the budget, 
scores much higher than the first three items. This is due to the fact that all budgetary 
spending needs the approval of the MoF and that any transfers of expenditures are limited to 
transfers within departments and need the authorization of the MoF. Furthermore, carrying-
over unused funds to the next year is limited and needs the MoF’s authorization. Note that 
France, Ireland and the UK in 2001 have considerably higher values on the fourth item than 
Japan. This is mainly due to the frequency of supplementary budgets in Japan, where the 
norm is to have at least one supplementary budget each year. As shown above in the 
difference between initial and actual spending, the supplementary budgets tend to erode the 
binding power of the initial budget law and with it the power of the Ministry of Finance to 
enforce it. The noticeable decline of Germany’s score on the fourth item reflects the fact that 
supplementary budgets have become the norm in that country only in the 1990s.  
Figure 2 shows the index for all EU countries and Japan. It puts Japan together with 
Italy, Greece, Ireland and Sweden into a group of countries with very weak budgetary 
institutions in 1991. These countries also had the worst fiscal performance in the 1980s 
(Tables 1-3). Figure 2 also shows that the EU countries with the weakest budgeting 
institutions in 1991 undertook institutional reforms during the 1990s which are reflected in 
sizeable increases in their index values.22 This is illustrated by the fact that the correlation 
between the index value in 1991 and the difference between the index in 2001 and 1991 is (-
0.83). Thus, the evidence suggests that the pressure of the fiscal rules of the Maastricht 
Treaty induced countries with weak budgeting institutions to improve the quality of their 
institutions, while countries with relatively strong institutions left their budgeting processes 
largely unchanged. If a better institutional design of the budget process leads to a permanent 
improvement in fiscal performance, this suggests that the fiscal rules of the Maastricht Treaty 
induced a lasting improvement in fiscal discipline in those EU states that reformed their 
budget processes. Note that this former group includes mainly small countries with relatively 
weak fiscal performance in the 1980s, while the large EU states except Spain did not do 
much to improve their budgeting institutions. Thus, our results are consistent with the 
remarkably different performance of the small and the large states since 1991 noted above.   
                                                
22 For details of the reforms see Hallerberg et al (2004). 
 Figure 3 shows the index values together with the average budget balances from 
Table 3, i.e. averages for 1986-91, 1992-98, and 1999-2003. The first two averages are 
plotted against the institutional index of 1991; the last one against the index from 2001. The 
figure also indicates the correlation of each pair of series. These correlations are around 0.40 
and statistically significant.23 The evidence confirms findings of earlier studies that budget 
processes of better institutional quality come with better fiscal performance.24 The new result 
in this study is that Japan with its combination of weak fiscal institutions and a relatively weak 
fiscal performance fits the same pattern. This suggests that strengthening institutions that 
reduce fragmentation of budget decisions and promote a comprehensive view of the costs 
and benefits of government activities promotes lower government deficits. 
 
4.2. Soft and Hard Fiscal Rules in the EU 
The EU fiscal rules, with their emphasis on numerical limits for the budget deficit and 
general government debt (EDP) and annual Stability Programs setting targets for deficits and 
governments spending (SGP) closely resemble the contract approach to centralization of the 
budget process. Table 8 pursues this similarity in more detail, using the institutional data 
from 2001. The upper half of the table lists the countries applying the contracts approach 
(Hallerberg et al. 2001, 2004), Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Ireland, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Portugal and Sweden. The lower half of the table lists the countries following 
the delegation approach, i.e., Austria, Germany, Spain, France, Greece, Italy, and the UK.  
 Hallerberg et al (2001) provide institutional data about the budgeting practices in the 
EU countries regarding specifically the governments’ commitment to fiscal rules. Here we 
look at the following aspects: The time horizon of a government’s multi-annual fiscal 
program, the degree of commitment to annual fiscal targets, the anchoring of the fiscal 
targets in the coalition agreement, the connection between the national budget and the 
national stability program, the existence of clear rules for dealing with shocks to expenditures 
or revenues during the fiscal year, and the strength of the finance minister to enforce the 
budget law during the implementation phase of the budget. We use the numerical coding of 
the institutional data to construct a “fiscal rules index.” A large value on this index indicates 
the following: A relatively long time horizon of the multi-annual fiscal program, a strong 
political commitment to the annual fiscal targets, fiscal targets being written into the coalition 
agreement, a close connection between the fiscal targets embedded in the budget and those 
expressed in the Stability Program and between the annual budget process and the process 
of writing and updating the Stability Programs, the prevalence of rules for dealing with 
                                                
23 The t-ratios are 2.45, 2.78, and 3.0, respectively.  
24 See von Hagen (1992), von Hagen and Harden (1994, 1995), Hallerberg and von Hagen 
(1999) for EU countries, Stein et al. (1999) for Latin American countries, Lao-Arayo (1997) for Asian 
countries, and Strauch (1988) for state governments in the US. 
unexpected spending or revenue developments, and a relatively strong finance minister 
during the implementation phase. A low value on this index indicates a short time horizon or 
the non-existence of a multi-annual fiscal program, the interpretation of fiscal targets as 
being merely indicative, no mentioning of fiscal targets in the coalition agreement, a loose 
connection only between the fiscal targets spelled out in the budget and those of the Stability 
Program and between the annual budget process and the process of writing and updating 
the Stability Program, no rules for dealing with revenue or expenditure shocks, and a weak 
position of the finance minister in the implementation phase of the budget.    
The last row of table 8 reports the fiscal rule index. The table shows that Luxembourg 
has the strongest fiscal rule in the EU, followed by the Netherlands, Belgium, the UK, Ireland, 
Portugal, and Denmark. The median fiscal rule index among the EU countries is 8.8. The 
table shows that countries following the contracts approach generally have harder fiscal rules 
than the delegation countries. Sweden and Finland are the only two contracts countries with 
a rules index below the median, while the UK is the only delegation country with an index 
strictly above the median. The difference between the two groups is statistically significant (a 
chi-square test has the value Χ2 = 5.53, p=0.019). This shows that there is a significant, 
positive correlation between the contract approach and hard fiscal rules, as well as between 
the delegation approach and soft fiscal rules. The evidence thus suggests that countries 
adopting the contract approach used the framework and pressure of the Maastricht process 
to develop strong fiscal rules. The delegation countries except the UK did not follow the 
same pattern. 
Considering the individual items, table 8 shows that the fiscal programs in contract 
states generally have longer time horizons than in delegation states, that the degree of 
commitment is stronger and than in delegation states, and that the fiscal targets in all 
contract states but in no delegation state are anchored in coalition agreements. Furthermore, 
a majority of the contract states have explicit rules for dealing with revenue or expenditure 
shocks. The UK is the only delegation state where that is true.  
The correlation between the fiscal rule index and the budget surplus ratios across the 
EU states is not statistically different from zero. The reason is that states with good 
budgeting institutions under the delegation approach achieved a high degree of fiscal 
discipline similar to states with strong fiscal rules. However, if we take the five states with a 
fiscal rules index above the EU average of 10.9, we see that a hard fiscal rule does make a 
difference. These states are Belgium, Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and the UK. All 
five experienced a negative annual growth rate of the debt-GDP ratio since the start of EMU. 
For the states with soft fiscal rules (i.e. an index below the mean) this is true for five out of 
ten. A chi-square test indicates that the difference in performance is statistically significant 
(Χ2 = 3.75, p=0.052). If we define the medium-term goal of “close to balance” under the SGP 
as an average surplus ratio above (-1.0) since the start of EMU, all five states with hard fiscal 
rules fulfill that condition, but only four out of six states with soft rules (Χ2 = 5.0, p=0.025). 
Finally, since the start of EMU, all five states with hard fiscal rules had an average 
expenditure ratio of at least two percent below the 1992-1998 average. For the states with 
soft rules, this is true only for six out of 10 (Χ2 = 2.73, p=0.098). Thus states with hard fiscal 
rules have shown a better average fiscal performance since the start of EMU – an example 
for Schick’s (2003, p. 8) verdict that “fiscal rules are effective only if they are supported by 
other changes in budgeting.”   
This evidence then gives rise to three conclusions. First, budgeting institutions per se 
matter more than fiscal rules. Second, the EU fiscal rules may have provided a useful 
opportunity for countries adopting the contracts approach to strengthen their budgeting 
institutions. Third, beyond that, they contribute to strengthening fiscal discipline in the EU 
only if they are complemented by domestic budgeting institutions turning them into hard 
rules.  
Why then did some countries adopt the contract approach and others the delegation 
approach? Hallerberg and von Hagen (1998) argue that this choice is determined by a 
country’s type of government. The delegation approach is appropriate for countries where 
the government is typically formed by one party or a coalition of a large party and a smaller 
one that has no obvious alternative coalition partner. The contracts approach is appropriate 
for countries where the government is typically formed by a coalition of several parties. The 
reason for this is in the different mechanisms for enforcing fiscal discipline in these two 
settings. Coalition governments find it hard to delegate significant agenda setting powers to 
the finance minister, because this minister necessarily comes from one of the coalition 
parties, and vesting him with superior power would raise concerns among the coalition 
partners about a fair treatment of their spending preferences. At the same time, the 
commitment to a fiscal target is easy to break for a single-party government, as the executive 
can simply walk away from the target with no serious political consequences. In a coalition 
setting, the threat to break up the coalition if the fiscal targets are not kept is a very effective 
protection of this commitment. This is also reflected in the fact that, during the 1990s, many 
coalition governments in Europe anchored their fiscal targets in the coalition agreement 
when the government was formed. Under the delegation approach, enforcement of fiscal 
discipline ultimately rests in the power of the prime minister to remove spending ministers 
from office if they do not follow the finance minister’s guidelines. This power does not usually 
exist in coalition governments, where the individual parties in the coalition have the right to 
choose the individuals filling the positions assigned to them in the coalition agreement. 
Hallerberg et al (2001) and von Hagen et al. (2004) show it is the parameters of the electoral 
systems that determine the type of government in Europe. Thus, the choice of budgeting 
institutions for better fiscal discipline is ultimately determined by a country’s constitution. The 
fiscal rules of the EU turned out to be appropriate for those countries, whose constitutions 
are compatible with the contract approach. Countries whose constitutions are compatible 
with the delegation approach, in contrast, made little use of these rules. As suggested by 
table 8, this includes all the large states of the EU, while the contract states are all small 
states. Thus, the stark difference in the fiscal performance of the large and the small states 
during the 1990s is ultimately explained by the differences in electoral systems.    
  Table 8 also reports the institutional scores and the fiscal rule index for Japan. 
Compared to the EU countries, Japan’s fiscal rule is obviously a soft one. Its fiscal targets 
have a relatively short time horizon and a medium degree of commitment. They are not 
embedded in coalition agreements. There are some rules for dealing with unexpected shocks 
and, as noted before, the MoF has a relatively strong position in the implementation phase of 
the budget. Overall, Japan’s score is comparable to those of Greece, Germany, or Sweden, 
i.e., with a relatively soft fiscal rule. 
  
5. Conclusions: A Hard Fiscal Rule for Japan?  
 Above, we have argued that excessive spending and deficits are the result of a 
coordination failure in public budgeting. The more fragmented the budget process, the more 
the common pool externality of public budgeting affects a government’s fiscal performance.  
In this context, the main role of the budget process is to overcome the coordination failure by 
promoting a comprehensive view of public finances among the relevant actors.  
This role of the budget process and its effectiveness cannot be regarded in isolation 
of a country’s political environment.25 Between 1955 and the late 1980s, Japan’s political 
system was dominated by the Liberal Democrat Party (LDP), which, as a result of the 
electoral rules, continuously enjoyed a majority in parliament. In this environment of little 
electoral competition, the government did not have a strong incentive to use discretionary 
fiscal policy to promote its chances of being reelected; hence we do not find an electoral 
effect during that period. The LDP itself consisted of a number of competing political factions 
which were institutionalized within the party apparatus and sought access to public funds to 
support their local power bases. Wright (2002) notes that the LDP’s ability to provide 
leadership declined in the 1980s compared to the 1970s. Furthermore, the LDP did not have 
a sufficiently strong majority to secure the passage of its own legislative agenda through 
parliament and needed the tacit agreement and support from opposition parties, mainly the 
Japan Socialist Party (JSP). In this context, the fiscal rule adopted in the early 1980s could 
be effective, because it was negotiated between the LDP leadership and the MoF and 
                                                
25 See Wright (2002) for the following account. 
offered a commitment device both between the LDP factions and to facilitate support from 
the opposition parties cooperating with the LDP. 
Japan’s political system changed importantly at the end of the 1980s. A first indication 
of the LDP’s decline was the loss of its majority in the 1989 elections to the Upper House. As 
a result of several years of bitter strife between the factions within the LDP, 40 members of 
the LDP abandoned their party in the House of Representatives in 1993 and toppled the LDP 
cabinet (Schaap, 2005). This marked the end of the LDP’s dominance in the Japanese 
parliament. Since then, electoral competition has become much stronger, and the 
government’s incentive to use fiscal policy to improve its chances of reelection with it. This 
explains why we find a strong electoral effect after 1992 in table 6C. Between 1993 and 
2001, Japan had several coalition governments. Furthermore, the Japanese party system 
has become fragmented with parties characterized by low internal coherence and instability 
(McKean and Schreiner, 2000; Laver and Kato, 2001).  
This environment seems fitter for the contracts approach than for the delegation 
approach of strengthening budgeting institutions. The experience of contract states like the 
Netherlands in the EU shows what this requires. First, budgeting in Japan should become 
comprehensive, moving away from the limited focus on the general account and covering all 
government spending in the budget process. Second, the annual budget process should start 
with an agreement among all coalition partners on fiscal targets for each spending ministry, 
creating clear responsibilities and accountability. These targets should be anchored in the 
coalition agreement, thus binding the party leaderships to the agreement, and, as in Sweden, 
party leaders could be admitted to the annual negotiations on the fiscal targets to ensure that 
the coalition partners feel committed to the agreement. However, the party leaderships 
should not be admitted to the subsequent, more detailed budget negotiations as they are 
today, as they could use their political influence to undermine the original agreement. The 
targets should be embedded in multi-annual fiscal plans closely connected to national 
accounts and macro economic forecasts to ensure consistency over time. They should set 
limits for the level rather than the increment in annual spending. Third, the position of the 
executive relative to parliament should be strengthened by asking parliament to take a vote 
on the main fiscal targets early in the budget process, turning these targets into binding 
constraints for the subsequent parliamentary phase of the budget process. Fourth, 
supplementary budgets should be ruled out and rules for dealing with revenue and 
expenditure shocks should be put in place instead. Fifth, transparency of the budget and the 
budget process should be improved to facilitate monitoring and enforcement of the fiscal 
contract. Finally, the position of the MoF in the implementation of the budget could be further 
strengthened by assuring its control over all parts of government spending.  
With changes in this direction, Japan would move towards the adoption of a hard 
fiscal rule. The EU experience of the past 15 years suggests that, given the nature of its 
political environment, this would be an effective way of strengthening fiscal discipline. A 
critical question remains, of course, namely what could induce policy makers to agree to 
such reforms and give up room for discretionary maneuvering. In the EU context, the risk of 
missing entry into the monetary union probably played some role in generating support for 
reforms of the budget process. However, the experience of countries like Denmark, Sweden, 
and Ireland, and much earlier, France (von Hagen and Harden, 1994), indicates that the 
fiscal pressures of a mounting debt burden and a looming fiscal crisis can achieve the same.    
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Table 1: Fiscal Targets in Japan 
    
1982 0% increase in budgetary requests 1993 Current spending max 10% decrease 
Investment spending 0% increase 
Special allowance for public investment and 
social programs 640 billion yen. *) 
1983 Max 5% decrease,  
0% increase on investment spending 
1994 Current spending max 10% decrease 
Investment spending max 5% increase 
Special allowance 290 billion yen. *) 
1984 Current spending max 10% decrerase 
Investment spending max 5% decrease  
1995 Current spending max 10% decrease 
Investment spending max 5% increase 
Special allowance 300 billion yen. *) 
1985 Same as 1984 1996 General administrative spending max 15% 
decrease 
Other current spending max 10% decrease 
Investment spending max 5% increase 
Special allowance 140 billion yen. *) 
1986 Same as 1984 1997 General administrative spending max 15% 
decrease 
Other current spending max 12.5% decrease 
Interest payment subsidies max 5% decrease 
Personnel expenditures max 0.8% decrease 
Investment spending max 0% increase 
Special allowance 300 billion yen. *) 
1987 Same as 1984 1998  Social Sec. Spending less than 300 billion 
increase 
Public investment max 7% decrease 
Foreign aid max 10% decrease 
Science and technology max 5% increase 
Zero ceilings on various specified types of 
spending 
  
1988 Current spending max 10% decrease 
Investment spending 0% increase  
*) 
1999 Public works spending 0% increase 
Science and technology max 5% increase 
Social security max increase 570 billion yen 
Remainder max 0% increase 
Special allowance for economic recovery 
4150 billion yen  
1989 Same as 1988 2000 Public works spending 0% increase 
Social security max increase 500 billion yen 
Remainder max 0% increase except for 
mandatory increase in personnel expenses 
Special allowance for economic recovery 250 
billion yen 
1990 Same as 1988 2001 Public works spending 0% increase 
Social security max increase 750 billion yen 
Remainder max 0% increase except for 
mandatory increase in personnel expenses 
Special allowance for economic recovery 300 
billion yen 
1991 Current spending max 10% decrease 
Investment spending 0% increase 
Special allowance for public investment 
and social programs 200 billion yen 
*) 
2002 Public investment related spending max 0% 
increase 
Public works spending 10% increase 
Social security except facility expenses max 
increase 700 billion yen 
Mandatory spending (including annual 
increase in personnel spending) 0% increase 
Remainder max 0%  
1992 
 
Current spending max 10% decrease 
Investment spending 0% increase 
Special allowance for public investment 
and social programs 400 billion yen. *) 
2003 Public investment related spending max 
120% of baseline for request 
Non-discretionary spending except personnel 
expenses, pensions and medical care, 
special factors maximum 0% increase 
Discretionary spending max 120% of baseline 
for requests 
Note: * Additional funds of 1300 billion yen under the NTT scheme. Source: MoF (2001, 
2002)
Table 2: General Government Debt (percent of GDP) 
 
Year BE DK D GR E F IE I L NL AT P SF S UK EUR-
12 
JP 
1980 78.5 36.4 31.7 27.7 17.0 20.4 72.3 58.0 9.2 46.0 36.1 35.3 11.6 39.6 55.0 34.0 61.6
1981 91.8 48.1 35.4 33.0 20.8 22.6 78.0 60.1 9.6 49.9 37.9 44.9 11.6 47.6 55.2 37.9 58.3
1982 102.4 60.0 38.7 37.3 25.7 26.3 87.7 65.1 9.5 55.3 40.3 48.2 14.3 56.8 54.1 42.1 64.9
1983 113.3 69.0 40.2 42.9 31.0 27.7 98.0 70.0 10.1 61.4 44.6 53.8 15.9 60.6 54.3 45.4 72.7
1984 117.5 72.7 41.0 51.2 37.0 30.0 102.3 75.3 10.0 65.5 47.2 59.3 15.7 62.1 56.3 49.4 71.8
1985 122.2 69.8 41.7 59.8 42.4 31.8 105.3 82.0 9.5 70.0 49.2 67.4 16.4 61.6 54.3 51.6 69.1
1986 127.4 61.9 41.6 62.2 43.7 32.3 117.1 86.3 9.2 72.0 53.7 66.0 17.1 61.3 52.7 54.0 69.2
1987 131.9 57.9 42.6 69.9 44.0 34.5 118.2 90.5 8.1 74.5 57.6 63.6 18.3 54.3 50.2 55.6 76.0
1988 131.9 60.0 43.1 76.4 40.4 34.5 113.8 92.6 6.5 77.5 58.8 63.1 17.1 48.8 43.6 56.4 72.4
1989 128.2 57.8 41.8 80.4 41.8 35.2 103.9 95.4 5.3 77.5 58.0 61.4 14.8 43.9 37.9 57.1 59.1
1990 128.6 57.7 43.5 89.0 43.7 36.3 97.5 97.3 4.5 77.1 57.3 63.4 14.5 42.1 35.2 57.7 64.4
1991 130.6 64.0 40.4 82.2 44.3 35.8 95.6 100.8 4.6 76.8 56.1 60.7 22.6 50.1 34.4 58.5 64.8
1992 132.2 69.4 42.9 87.8 46.8 39.6 92.5 108.1 5.5 77.9 55.8 54.4 40.5 63.3 39.2 60.3 68.7
1993 137.9 81.1 46.9 110.1 58.4 45.3 95.1 118.7 6.8 79.3 60.5 59.1 55.9 71.3 45.4 66.2 74.9
1994 135.9 77.4 49.3 107.9 61.1 48.4 89.6 124.8 6.3 76.4 63.4 62.1 58.0 73.9 48.6 68.9 79.7
1995 134.0 73.2 57.0 108.7 63.9 54.6 81.8 124.3 6.7 77.2 67.9 64.3 57.1 73.7 51.8 73.6 87.1
1996 130.2 69.7 59.8 111.3 68.1 57.1 73.3 123.1 7.2 75.2 67.6 62.9 57.1 73.5 52.3 75.2 93.9
1997 124.8 65.7 61.0 108.2 66.6 59.3 64.5 120.5 6.8 69.9 63.8 59.1 54.1 70.6 50.8 74.9 100.3
1998 119.6 61.2 60.9 105.8 64.6 59.5 53.8 116.7 6.3 66.8 64.2 55.0 48.6 68.1 47.7 74.1 112.2
1999 114.8 57.7 61.2 105.2 63.1 58.5 48.6 115.5 5.9 63.1 66.5 54.3 47.0 62.7 45.1 72.7 125.7
2000 109.1 52.3 60.2 114.0 61.1 56.8 38.3 111.2 5.5 55.9 67.0 53.3 44.6 52.8 42.0 70.4 134.1
2001 108.1 49.2 59.4 114.7 57.5 56.5 35.9 110.6 5.5 52.9 67.1 55.8 43.8 54.4 38.8 69.4 142.3
2002 105.8 48.8 60.9 112.5 54.4 58.8 32.7 107.9 5.7 52.6 66.6 58.4 42.6 52.6 38.3 69.4 149.4
2003 100.7 45.9 64.2 109.9 50.7 63.7 32.1 106.2 5.4 54.1 65.1 60.3 45.6 52.0 39.8 70.7 157.6
     
Average Change in Debt Ratio  
81-85 8.7 6.7 2.0 6.4 5.1 2.3 6.6 4.8 0.1 4.8 2.6 6.4 1.0 4.4 -0.1 3.5 1.5
86-91 1.4 -1.3 0.4 5.2 0.3 0.8 -1.3 3.1 -0.9 1.2 1.4 -0.4 1.1 -1.7 -3.2 1.2 -1.4
92-98 -1.6 -0.4 2.9 3.4 2.9 3.4 -6.0 2.3 0.2 -1.4 1.2 -0.8 3.7 2.6 1.9 2.2 6.8
99-03 -3.8 -3.1 0.7 0.8 -2.8 0.8 -4.3 -2.1 -0.2 -2.5 0.2 1.1 -0.6 -3.2 -1.6 -0.7 9.1
Note: EUR-12 is the weighted average of the 12 member states of EMU, Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, France, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg,  
the Netherlands, Austria, Portugal, and Finland.  Source: European Commission AMECO Database and own calculations 
Table 3: General Government Budget Balances (percent of GDP) 
 
Year BE DK D GR ES F IE I L NL AT P SF S UK JP 
1980 -8.6 -3.2 -2.9 -2.6 -2.5 0.0 -11.6 -8.6 -0.4 -4.1 -1.6 -8.5 3.3 -3.9 -3.4 -4.4
1981 -12.6 -6.7 -3.7 -9.0 -3.7 -1.9 -12.2 -11.5 -3.1 -5.1 -1.7 -12.5 4.4 -5.1 -2.6 -3.8
1982 -10.7 -8.8 -3.3 -6.8 -5.3 -2.7 -12.6 -11.3 -1.0 -6.3 -3.3 -8.4 2.5 -6.7 -2.5 -3.6
1983 -11.4 -6.9 -2.6 -7.5 -4.5 -3.1 -10.7 -10.6 1.9 -5.5 -3.8 -6.8 0.9 -4.8 -3.3 -3.6
1984 -9.4 -4.0 -1.9 -8.3 -5.2 -2.7 -8.9 -11.6 3.2 -5.3 -2.5 -10.3 2.7 -2.8 -3.9 -2.1
1985 -8.9 -2.0 -1.2 -11.6 -6.1 -2.8 -10.2 -12.5 6.2 -3.5 -2.4 -10.2 2.8 -3.7 -2.9 -0.8
1986 -9.3 3.3 -1.3 -9.4 -5.5 -2.7 -10.1 -11.6 4.3 -4.9 -3.6 -5.7 3.3 -1.2 -2.5 -0.9
1987 -7.6 2.3 -1.9 -9.1 -3.7 -1.9 -8.1 -11.0 2.7 -5.7 -4.2 -5.4 1.0 4.1 -1.6 0.5
1988 -6.7 1.5 -2.2 -11.4 -3.3 -1.6 -4.2 -10.7 : -4.4 -3.0 -3.4 4.0 3.4 0.7 1.5
1989 -6.1 0.3 0.1 -14.2 -3.5 -1.2 -1.7 -9.8 : -4.6 -2.7 -2.3 6.2 5.2 1.0 2.5
1990 -5.4 -1.0 -2.1 -15.9 -4.1 -1.5 -2.2 -11.0 4.7 -4.9 -2.4 -4.9 5.3 4.0 -0.9 2.9
1991 -7.5 -2.5 -2.9 -11.0 -3.9 -2.4 -2.9 -11.7 1.2 -2.7 -2.9 -7.6 -1.0 -0.7 -3.1 2.1
1992 -8.1 -2.3 -2.6 -12.2 -3.6 -4.2 -3.0 -10.7 0.2 -4.2 -1.9 -4.8 -5.5 -7.1 -6.5 0.7
1993 -7.4 -2.9 -3.1 -13.4 -6.3 -6.0 -2.7 -10.3 1.5 -2.8 -4.2 -8.1 -7.2 -11.4 -7.9 -2.4
1994 -5.1 -2.4 -2.4 -9.3 -5.7 -5.5 -2.0 -9.3 2.7 -3.5 -4.9 -7.7 -5.7 -9.3 -6.8 -3.8
1995 -4.4 -2.3 -10.0 -10.2 -6.6 -5.5 -2.1 -7.6 2.1 -9.1 -5.7 -5.5 -3.9 -6.9 -5.8 -4.7
1996 -3.8 -1.0 -3.4 -7.4 -5.0 -4.1 -0.1 -7.1 1.9 -1.8 -4.0 -4.8 -2.9 -2.8 -4.2 -5.1
1997 -2.0 0.4 -2.7 -4.0 -3.2 -3.0 1.5 -2.7 3.2 -1.1 -2.0 -3.6 -1.3 -1.0 -2.2 -3.8
1998 -0.7 1.1 -2.2 -2.5 -3.0 -2.7 2.3 -3.1 3.2 -0.8 -2.5 -3.2 1.6 1.9 0.1 -5.5
1999 -0.4 3.2 -1.5 -1.8 -1.2 -1.8 2.5 -1.8 3.7 0.7 -2.3 -2.9 1.9 1.9 1.0 -7.2
2000 0.2 2.5 -1.2 -4.2 -1.0 -1.4 4.4 -1.9 6.0 1.4 -2.0 -3.2 7.0 3.7 0.9 -7.5
2001 0.4 2.8 -2.8 -4.2 -0.4 -1.6 1.0 -2.7 4.5 -0.1 0.1 -4.4 4.9 2.9 -0.2 -6.1
2002 0.1 1.6 -3.7 -3.8 -0.1 -3.4 -0.4 -2.4 2.8 -1.9 -0.4 -2.7 4.3 -0.3 -1.7 -7.9
2003 0.3 1.0 -3.8 -4.6 0.4 -4.1 0.2 -2.5 0.8 -3.2 -1.3 -2.8 2.1 0.1 -3.4 -8.0
Averages    
81-85 -10.3 -5.3 -2.6 -7.6 -4.6 -2.2 -11.0 -11.0 1.1 -5.0 -2.6 -9.5 2.8 -4.5 -3.1 -3.1
86-91 -6.1 -0.4 -1.9 -13.2 -3.8 -1.6 -2.6 -10.4 3.3 -4.2 -2.8 -4.1 3.5 2.9 -0.4 2.5
92-98 -4.9 -1.5 -2.8 -8.8 -4.7 -4.2 -1.1 -7.8 2.0 -2.6 -3.5 -5.7 -3.2 -4.7 -4.6 -2.8
99-03 0.1 2.2 -2.6 -3.7 -0.5 -2.6 1.5 -2.3 3.6 -0.6 -1.2 -3.2 4.0 1.7 -0.7 -7.3
Source: European Commission AMECO Database and own calculations 
 
Table 4: General Government Spending (percent of GDP) 
 
Year BE DK D GR E F IE I L NL AT P SF S UK JP 
1980 56.2 53.1 48.0 28.8 31.6 45.4 46.1 42.8 47.7 54.4 46.9 36.6 38.6 59.5 43.2 32.5
1981 60.7 56.6 48.9 34.5 34.0 48.1 47.6 46.8 50.9 56.2 48.2 42.5 39.6 61.9 44.5 33.4
1982 61.0 57.8 49.3 35.3 35.7 49.8 49.8 48.3 48.7 58.3 48.8 40.5 41.1 64.1 44.9 33.6
1983 61.2 52.8 48.0 37.7 36.7 50.8 49.6 49.4 48.1 58.4 48.7 41.4 42.8 63.8 45.0 33.9
1984 59.8 57.0 47.6 38.6 37.1 51.4 48.4 50.2 45.2 57.3 49.0 44.1 42.5 61.3 45.4 32.9
1985 59.5 56.3 47.2 41.9 40.1 52.0 49.0 51.5 43.7 55.7 50.0 43.3 44.2 62.7 44.2 32.2
1986 59.1 52.8 46.5 41.0 40.1 51.5 48.9 51.7 42.5 55.6 50.9 38.8 45.1 61.0 42.8 32.5
1987 57.7 54.1 46.9 41.5 39.9 50.9 47.0 51.1 45.1 57.1 51.3 37.8 45.7 57.3 41.1 32.7
1988 55.3 56.8 46.4 42.4 39.6 49.9 43.9 51.2 : 55.4 50.0 36.6 44.2 57.5 38.3 31.9
1989 52.8 57.0 45.0 43.9 41.3 49.0 37.8 51.9 : 52.7 48.6 35.6 42.5 57.9 37.8 31.1
1990 52.8 56.1 45.3 48.4 42.3 49.7 38.0 53.8 43.2 52.8 49.3 39.0 46.1 58.6 39.2 31.9
1991 54.4 57.9 47.1 46.7 43.2 51.6 44.9 55.5 44.4 54.8 52.9 45.1 57.7 63.5 44.0 32.1
1992 54.6 59.1 48.1 49.4 44.6 52.9 45.3 56.7 46.0 55.8 53.6 46.2 63.0 69.2 46.1 33.1
1993 55.7 61.7 49.3 52.0 47.6 55.2 45.1 57.7 45.7 56.0 56.7 47.8 64.2 73.0 46.1 35.0
1994 53.4 61.6 49.0 49.9 45.8 54.9 44.4 54.6 44.5 53.6 56.2 46.0 62.9 70.9 45.3 35.6
1995 52.9 60.3 49.4 51.0 45.0 55.2 41.6 53.4 45.5 56.4 56.0 45.0 59.6 67.7 45.0 36.7
1996 52.9 59.8 50.3 49.2 43.7 55.4 39.7 53.2 45.6 49.6 55.4 45.8 59.7 65.3 43.0 37.2
1997 51.4 58.0 49.3 47.8 41.8 54.9 37.2 51.1 43.3 48.2 53.1 44.8 56.4 63.0 41.4 36.1
1998 50.7 57.6 48.8 47.8 41.4 53.7 34.9 49.9 42.0 47.2 53.4 44.1 52.8 60.7 40.2 42.5
1999 50.1 56.3 48.7 47.6 40.2 53.4 34.5 48.9 41.2 46.9 53.2 45.3 52.1 60.3 39.7 39.0
2000 49.3 54.8 48.2 52.1 40.0 52.6 31.9 48.1 38.7 46.0 51.7 45.6 49.1 57.3 42.2 39.6
2001 49.5 55.5 48.3 50.2 39.6 53.1 33.5 48.7 38.8 46.7 50.9 46.3 49.2 57.2 40.9 39.2
2002 50.2 55.8 48.7 49.1 39.9 53.5 33.8 48.0 43.1 47.8 50.6 46.0 50.1 58.2 41.7 39.8
2003 51.0 56.2 48.8 48.3 39.6 54.6 34.3 49.0 44.9 49.0 50.8 47.8 51.1 58.3 43.6 39.1
Averages    
80-85 59.7 55.6 48.2 36.1 35.9 49.6 48.4 48.2 47.4 56.7 48.6 41.4 41.5 62.2 44.5 33.1
86-91 55.3 55.7 46.3 43.7 41.1 50.2 42.4 52.3 43.8 54.5 50.1 38.2 46.4 58.8 39.8 31.9
92-98 53.3 59.5 48.9 49.2 44.1 54.2 41.6 54.0 44.6 52.7 54.7 45.6 59.5 66.7 43.9 36.0
99-03 50.0 55.7 48.5 49.5 39.9 53.4 33.6 48.5 41.3 47.3 51.4 46.2 50.3 58.3 41.6 39.3
Note: All entries in percent of GDP. Data for 2000 and 2001 are corrected for one-off proceeds from UTMS auctions.  
Source: European Commission AMECO Database and own calculations 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 1: General Account Spending and Deficit
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Table 5: Fiscal Impulses in the EU and Japan 
Country Standard- 
Deviation 
81-03 
Average 
81-91 
Average 
92-03 
p-value a) Average 
99-03 
p-value b) 
BE 1.44 
0.76(0.02) 
-0.25 -0.67 0.41 -1.10 0.05 
DK 2.13 
1.06(0.02) 
-0.28 -1.22 0.12 -1.28 0.17 
D 2.16 
0.61(0.00) 
-1.28 -0.62 0.17 -0.98 0.08 
GR 2.76 -0.37 -0.89 0.34 -2.28 0.00 
E 0.98 -0.87 -0.75 0.38 -0.81 0.41 
F 0.81 -1.12 -1.05 0.85 -1.48 0.10 
IE 1.93 -0.20 -2.70 0.00 -3.17 0.20 
I 1.32 -0.59 -0.38 0.36 -1.01 0.08 
L 1.86 .. -2.00 .. -2.44 0.05 
NL 1.42 -0.69 -1.34 0.14 -1.58 0.58 
AT 1.23 -1.03 -0.98 0.46 -0.77 0.45 
P 1.96 -0.24 -0.92 0.21 -0.71 0.36 
SF 1.93 -1.51 -1.03 0.29 -1.54 0.19 
S 2.21 -0.72 -1.39 0.24 -2.58 0.07 
UK 1.40 -0.99 -1.18 0.38 -2.04 0.06 
JP 0.61 
1.17(0.03) 
-0.30 -1.28 0.02 -0.99 0.25 
Note: For Belgium, Denmark, Germany, and Japan, we report sample standard deviations for 1981-91 
(upper entry), 1992-2003 (lower entry) and the p-value of a F-test for equal variances. For all other 
countries, the F-test for equal variances did not reject the Null-hypothesis.  P-value a) is the p-value of a t-
test for equal means (one-sided test) between 1981-91 and 1992-2003, accounting for unequal variances 
where necessary. P-value b) is the corresponding one-sided test for the mean of 1991-98 being larger than 
the mean of 1999-2003. Source: Own calculations. 
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Table 6A: Empirical Model of Fiscal Impulses in the EU, 1981-1991 
 Dependent Variable: Fiscal Impulse 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Constant -0.72 -0.94 -0.70
p-value 0.053 0.02 0.035
Lagged fiscal impulse -0.28
p-value 0.73
Crisis Dummy -6.31 -5.82 -5.17
p-value 0.00 0.000 0.0005
Lagged Debt Ratio 0.013 0.013 0.014
p-value 0.008 0.008 0.004
Real GDP Growth Rate  -0.27 -0.21 -0.21
p-value 0.0004 0.003 0.003
Election Dummy  -0.89
p-value 0.002
R2 0.21 0.17 0.22
F-Test (p-value) 0.000 0.000 0.000
Number of observations 141 154 154
 
 Table 6B: Empirical Model of Fiscal Impulses in the EU, 1992-2003 
 Dependent Variable: Fiscal Impulse 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 
Constant -1.24 -1.26 -0.83 -0.93 -1.13
p-value 0.002 0.001 0.038 0.023 0.0035
Lagged fiscal impulse 0.016  
p-value 0.85  
Lagged Debt Ratio 0.0097 0.0099 0.008 0.008 0.0088
p-value 0.048 0.042 0.089 0.089 0.062
Real GDP Growth Rate  -0.19 -0.20 -0.19 -0.20 -0.21
p-value 0.001 0.001 0.0009 0.0004 0.0002
EMU Dummy -0.73 -0.42 
 0.004 0.15 
Election Dummy 0.54 0.71
 0.16 0.055
(Election Dummy)*(EMU 
Dummy) 
-1.21 -1.64
 0.037 0.001
R2 0.08 0.09 0.13 0.15 0.14
F-Test (p-value) 0.02 0.0006 0.0004 0.00005 0.00005
Number of observations 168 168 168 168 168
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Table 6C: Discretionary Policy in Japan, 1981-2003 
 Dependent Variable: Fiscal Impulse 
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Constant -0.12 0.24 -1.54
p-value 0.88 0.29 0.016
Lagged Debt Ratio  0.019 0.018 0.019
p-value 2.62 0.027 0.031
Real GDP Growth Rate -0.32 -0.36 
p-value 0.059 0.038 
Election Dummy -0.79 -1.25 
p-value 0.14 0.004 
Post-1991 Dummy -3.08 -3.35 -1.59
p-value 0.001 0.0006 0.003
(Post-1991 Dummy)*GDP Growth Rate 0.79 0.72 0.47
p-value 0.006 0.027 0.039
(Post-1991 Dummy)*Election Dummy -1.78  -1.78
 0.005  0.008
R2 0.66 0.62 0.55
F-Test (p-value) 0.004 0.003 0.0046
Number of Observations 23 23 23
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Table 7: Index of Budgeting Institutions: Selected EU Countries and Japan 
  Germany France Ireland Italy UK Japan 
Budget 
Negotiations  
12.00 16.00 3.00 7.66 15.00 3.83
Parliamentary 
Stage 
4.00 18.00 8.00 6.00 16.00 6.00
Informativeness 17.00 14.66 5.00 5.00 16.00 2.00
Flexibility of 
Execution 
18.60 20.20 11.00 1.00 11.40 12.66
Index  
 
 
 
 
1991 
41.20 55.60 20.73 17.12 48.20 18.67
Budget 
Negotiations  
11.00 16.00 14.00 16.00 14.00 2.00
Parliamentary 
Stage 
14.00 16.00 16.00 14.00 20.00 6.00
Informativeness 17.46 18.66 16.00 12.33 16.00 2.00
Flexibility of 
Execution 
11.46 16.33 14.93 12.00 17.60 12.66
Index  
 
 
 
2001 
 
43.44 54.61 49.55 45.06 54.53 16.84
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2: Index of Budgeting Institutions
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Figure 3: Budgeting Institutions and Budget Balances
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Table 8: Fiscal Rules Index, EU Countries and Japan 
Country Horizon Commit Coalition Stability 
Program
Shock 
Rules 
MoF 
Implementation 
Fiscal 
Rule 
Index 
Countries Following Contracts Approach 
B 4 4 4 2 4 1 15.0 
DK 3 2 0 0 4 2 9.3 
Ei 2 2 4 3 0 3 11.3 
L 4 4 4 3 4 2 17.0 
NL 3 4 4 3 4 1 15.3 
P 2 4 0 0.5 4 2 10.5 
SF 3 3 4 1 0 1 8.7 
SW 2 4 2 1.5 0 0 6.8 
Countries Following Delegation Approach 
A 2 3 0 1.5 0 4 8.8 
D 3 3 0 1.5 0 2 7.5 
E 3 2 0 1.5 0 3 7.8 
F 2 3 0 1.5 0 4 8.8 
Gr 2 2 0 0.5 0 4 7.2 
I 3 2 0 1.5 0 3 7.8 
UK 2 3 0 3.5 4 4 14.8 
Japan 2.5 2.5 0 0 2 2 7.3 
Note: Fiscal Rule Index = 2*(Horizon+Commitment+Coalition)/3+Stability Program + Shock 
Rules + MoF Execution. 
Source: own calculations 
 
 
 
